I. INTRODUCTION
In New York v. Quarles,' the United States Supreme Court created a significant exception to the rule prescribed in its historic decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 2 In Quarles, the Court held that police officers need not administer Miranda warnings prior to asking suspects questions that are "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." '3 This decision clearly departA from Miranda. In Miranda, the Court applied the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to protect suspects from the compelling pressures of police interrogation. 4 Reasoning that the Miranda warnings might deter a suspect from divulging information necessary to protect the public, the Quarles Court weighed the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against the need for information where the public safety is imperiled, and deemed that the added factor of "public safety" tilted the "scales of social utility" 5 toward society's need for information and away from the accused's fifth amendment rights. 6 Quarles fits into a general trend of Burger Court decisions that have deviated from both the letter and the spirit of Miranda. 7 Before Quarles, the Burger Court's Miranda decisions had focused largely on the scope and application of Miranda, addressing issues such as what constitutes "custody" and "interrogation" under Miranda. 8 Quarles attacks the core of Miranda, however, representing the first time that the Court has allowed self-incriminating statements that were obtained without Miranda warnings to be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Furthermore, the QuarLes Court continued a trend of obscuring Miranda's per se test by applying a factbased analysis that may confuse both lower courts and law enforcement agencies 9 over the proper use of the public safety exception. This Note will argue that the Court's public safety exception is unjustifiable in light of both the facts in Quarles and the legal precedent. In addition, this Note will examine the possible effects of the public safety exception on police departments, lower courts, and accused persons.
II. HISTORY

A. MIRANDA V ARIZONA
In its landmark Miranda decision, the United States Supreme Court sought to eradicate coercive police interrogation practices that deprived suspects of their fifth amendment constitutional privilege to be free from self-incrimination. 10 The Court reviewed police manuals and past cases that evinced custodial interrogations involving beatings, deprivations of food, and tactics stressing interrogacover compelling interrogations outside of the police custody context. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (custodial interrogation includes questioning defendant in his own home if defendant is "deprived of his freedom of action. . . in any significant way"); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (interrogation by IRS officials of incarcerated defendant in state correctional institution constitutes custodial interrogation). Id. at 327 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477). The Burger Court decisions run counter to the Warren Court decisions, evincing a trend to restrict the scope of Miranda to incustody police questioning. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (interrogation of a suspect at a police station is not "custodial" because the suspect was not under arrest); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury questioning is not custodial because judicial inquiries are not equivalent to police custody interrogations); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (IRS agent's interrogation of a defendant was not custodial interrogation because questioning took place in a relaxed atmosphere and the taxpayer was neither arrested nor detained against his will).
The case directly concerning "interrogation" is Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980) . In Innis, the Burger Court defined interrogation as " [a] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect." Id. at 301. The Court found that an officer's statement in the suspect's presence that a missing murder weapon might cause injury to a handicapped child was not interrogation because there was "nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware that respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children." Id. at 302.
9 For a discussion of this trend, 1315 (1983) .
10 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. tion in isolation." To curb the use of these tactics, the Court held that the "prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."' 12 The Court required the police to inform each suspect that "he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to an attorney, either retained or appointed. "' 13 Before Miranda, courts used the traditional due process voluntariness test, a subjective analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which police elicited incriminating statements to determine whether the statement was the product of the suspect's free will.' 4 Miranda relieved courts of having to consider the totality of the circumstances under the voluntariness standard.' 5 The Court declared that custodial interrogation was inherently coercive and that any statements elicited without the prescribed warnings were not volunteered by the defendant and were inadmissible.' 6 This presumption of compulsion could only be rebutted if the prosecution proved that the suspects "knowingly, and intelligently" waived their Miranda rights.
17 Thus, the Court issued a per se rule that was a REV. 935 (1966) . One source of difficulty in applying the voluntariness test is the requirement that a suspect make a reasoned or "rational" choice to answer questions. This choice on the part of the suspect seems to involve abilities that the typical criminal suspect does not possess. One commentator noted that " [t] o the extent that this factor is important in the tests courts are to apply to a challenged confession, the application of that test becomes a formidable task indeed." Id. at 984. See also Sonenshein, supra note 7, at 413-14. S. 506 (1962) , and waiver of counsel before pleading guilty, Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972 ), cited in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973 .
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the petitioner, an accused counterfeiter, was tried, convicted, and sentenced without the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether "upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding th[e] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused, the petitioner has intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel." 304 U.S. at 464. 477 (1981) . In Edwards, the defendant was arrested on charges of robbery, burglary, and murder, and taken to the police station where he was given Miranda warnings. At the station, Edwards invoked his right to have counsel present during the interrogation. The police ceased questioning Edwards, but the next day, two police officers resumed questioning after again informing Edwards of his rights. Edwards then confessed. The Court held that the resumed interrogation violated the petitioner's Miranda rights because the right to have counsel, once invoked, protects the suspect from further questioning unless he initiates the conversation with the police officers. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that Tucker's statements had been rightfully suppressed and Henderson's testimony correctly admitted, even though discovering Henderson's name was the product of a Miranda violation. 2 8 In so holding, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that Miranda proscribed a set of "protective guidelines" to help police officers "conduct interrogations without facing a continuous risk that valuable evidence would be lost." 2 9 These procedural safeguards, commonly referred to as the Miranda rules, "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." 3 0 Justice Rehnquist's distinction between constitutional rights and nonconstitutional prophylactic standards led him to conclude that the police conduct was not so flagrant as to violate Tucker's compulsory right against self-incrimination, but was merely a failure to provide Tucker with the "full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda." 3 1 Although the police had failed to comply with Miranda's strictly proscribed warnings, the Court held that Tucker's fifth amendment privilege was preserved because "the interrogation in the case involved no compulsion suffi- S. 471 (1963) . In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court suppressed both physical evidence (narcotics) and verbal evidence (incriminating statements of a third party) because the evidence was derived from an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. The Wong Sun doctrine, that evidence derived from police misconduct amounting to a constitutional violation must be suppressed, was not applied by the Tucker Court because it found that the police conduct was not egregious enough to infringe upon Tucker's constitutional rights. This same conclusion was made with respect to the police conduct in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2640 n.4 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
36 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974 
III. FACTS
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on September 11, 1980, while police officers Frank Kraft and Sal Scarring were on road patrol, a young woman approached their car and told the officers that she had just been raped. 40 The woman described her assailant as a black male approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with "Big Ben" inscribed in yellow letters on the back. She further told the officers that her attacker had just entered a local supermarket and that he was armed with a gun.
1
The officers drove the woman to the store, and Officer Kraft entered the market while his partner remained in the car and radioed for assistance. 4 2 Officer Kraft immediately noticed a man who fit the description at a nearby checkout counter. Upon seeing Kraft, the suspect, Benjamin Quarles, fled toward the back of the store. Officer Kraft drew his gun and chased Quarles, but temporarily lost sight of him. Upon relocating Quarles, Officer Kraft ordered him to stop and to raise his hands above his head.
3
Officer Kraft, the first officer to reach Quarles, frisked Quarles and found that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. 44 Kraft then handcuffed Quarles and asked him where he put the gun. Quarles nodded his head in the direction of an empty stack of cartons and stated, "the gun is over there." ' 45 Id.
[Vol. 75and agreed to answer questions. 46 In Quarles' subsequent prosecution for the criminal possession of a weapon, 4 7 the trial judge excluded the statement "the gun is over there" because it was elicited before Officer Kraft informed Quarles of his rights. 48 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed without opinion 4 9 and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a 4-3 margin, finding that Quarles was in police custody within the meaning of Miranda. 50 The court refused to recognize a public safety exception to Miranda, rejecting the State's argument that the exigencies of the situation allowed Officer Kraft to find the gun before reading the suspect his rights. 5 ' In declining to recognize the exception, the court of appeals stated that
[e]ven if it be assumed that an emergency exception to the normal rule might be recognized if the purpose of the police inquiry had been to locate and to confiscate the gun for the protection of the public... there is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that police interrogation was prompted by any such concern.
5 2
The court of appeals stressed that "neither of the courts below, with fact finding jurisdiction, made any factual determination that the police acted in the interest of public safety." 5 3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 5 4 and held that the facts of Quarles mandated a public safety exception to Miranda. 55
IV.
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found that the New York Court of Appeals erroneously excluded both Quarles' statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun. 5 6 In addition, the majority held that Quarles' subsequent statements concerning the ownership and place of purchase of the gun were not tainted by the 46 Id. Officer Kraft then asked Quarles if he owned the gun and where he purchased it. Quarles answered that the gun was his and that he bought it in Miami, Florida. Id.
47 Id. The State decided not to prosecute the rape charge, but the record provides no information as to why the charge was dropped. Id. at 2630 n. prior violation and were thus admissible in court. 5 7 The Court adopted a public safety exception to Miranda, holding that where the exigencies of the situation pose a threat to public safety, a police officer may question suspects prior to advising them of their rights.
58
Justice Rehnquist began his analysis with a brief history of the fifth amendment and the meaning of Miranda. Rehnquist quoted Michigan v. Tucker for the proposition that Miranda warnings are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory selfincrimination [is] protected." 59 Finding that the Quarles case presents "no claim that respondent's statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist," Justice Rehnquist narrowed the issue before the Court to "whether Officer Kraft was justified in failing to make available to respondent the procedural safeguards associated with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda." 60 57 Id. 58 Id. at 2632, 2633. In a footnote, the majority analogized the new public safety exception to Miranda to the time-honored exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the fourth amendment context. Id. at 2630 n.3. This analogy is problematical. Two major differences distinguish the fourth amendment exclusionary rule from the fifth amendment exclusionary rule: (1) the fourth amendment rule, excluding evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search, was ajudicially created rule, while the fifth amendment exclusionary rule against compulsory self-incrimination is constitutionally mandated; (2) there is little doubt about the reliability of evidence obtained through a fourth amendment violation because the evidence is usually physical evidence, while one of the rationales for the fifth amendment exclusionary rule is that "compelled testimony" induced under coercive conditions may be unreliable and therefore must be suppressed. These two differences lead some commentators to conclude that courts are less justified in creating exceptions to the fifth amendment. 259, 263-64 (1979) .
The argument that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is judicially created while the fifth amendment exclusionary rule is constitutionally compelled has lost some significance in light of Michigan v. Tucker. Prior to Tucker, reading a suspect his rights had been a constitutional requirement, and the failure to do so led to the exclusion of evidence obtained thereafter. Tucker, however, essentially reduced Miranda warnings to nonconstitutional prophylactic measures, holding that derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda prophylactic error could be admitted at trial. 417 U.S. at 450.
The argument for more stringent application of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule, to insure the reliability of evidence, still remains a viable argument. The Quarles majority's failure to show that questioning about public safety issues will be less coercive than other custodial interrogation leaves open the possibility that unreliable statements will be used to convict suspects.
59 Id. at 2631 (citing Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444). 60 Id.
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Justice Rehnquist agreed with the New York Court of Appeals' finding that because Quarles was handcuffed and surrounded by four police officers, he was "in custody" within the ambit of Miranda. 6 ' Justice Rehnquist then stated that the New York Court of Appeals had declined to issue an opinion on the public safety exception "because the lower courts in New York had made no factual determination that the police had acted with that motive." ' 62 Justice Rehnquist asserted that a public safety exception should not depend on an officer's subjective motivations for interrogating a suspect, but it should apply "to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety." 6 3
Next, Justice Rehnquist recounted the judicial balancing test undertaken by the Court in Miranda. According to Justice Rehnquist, the Miranda majority was willing to accept that Miranda warnings may deter suspects from responding to police interrogation because suspects would be given added protection for their fifth amendment rights. 64 By plugging the facts of Quarles into the judicial balancing equation, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the cost of reciting Miranda warnings was increased significantly by the added factor of public safety. Not only might the warnings have cost the officers the use of incriminating statements and evidence, but they also might hamper the officers in their duty "to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area." 65 This possibility of public endangerment led Justice Rehnquist to conclude "that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. ' 6 6 The QuarLes majority acknowledged that the public safety exception would obscure the relatively clear state of the law in Miranda cases. 67 Justice Rehnquist, however, believed that the police officers would have little difficulty determining when to apply the exception. The following facts from Quar/es supported his faith in the ability of police officers to intuitively distinguish between questions necessary to preserve the public safety and questions asked to elicit incriminat- ing evidence from suspects: "Officer Kraft asked only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before advising respondent of his rights. It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun." ' 68 Rather than "complicating the thought processes and the on-the-scene judgments of police officers," Justice Rehnquist felt that the Court's decision would simply "free them to follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the public safety."
69
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment that the gun was admissible, dissented from the Court's ruling that the statement "the gun is over there" was admissible. 70 Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's focus on balancing public safety concerns against an individual's fifth amendment privilege missed the critical question to be decided. 7 1 According to Justice O'Connor, Miranda focused upon the question of "who shall bear the cost of securing the public safety when such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or the State." 72 The Miranda Court clearly placed the burden on the state. Justice O'Connor stated that when police interrogate suspects in custody without reading them their rights, "Miranda quite clearly requires that answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial." ' 73 In Justice O'Connor's view, "since there is nothing about an exigency that makes custodial interrogation any less compelling, a principled application of Miranda requires that respondent's statement be suppressed."
74
In the second part of her opinion, Justice O'Connor tackled the 68 Id. 69 Id. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist implicitly assumed that because there was no Miranda violation in Quares, the pre-Miranda statements, the gun, and the post-Miranda "tainted fruits" were admissible in court. Furthermore, by holding that there was no violation, the Court could disregard the State's arguments that the gun was admissible either because it was nontestimonial evidence or because it inevitably would have been discovered. Id. at 2634 n.9.
70 Id. at 2634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part question of whether the gun also must be suppressed. 75 Justice O'Connor distinguished Miranda on the ground that the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination covers only testimonial evidence and does not protect the accused from being compelled to surrender self-incriminating nontestimonial evidence. 7 6 This distinction enabled Justice O'Connor to maintain that Quarles' statements were inadmissible, but that the gun must not be suppressed.
7
To substantiate her assertion, Justice O'Connor first confronted adverse precedent which suggested that the privilege against self-incrimination required suppression of all evidence derived from an encroachment on a fifth amendment privilege. (1966) , for the proposition that -the state may compel an individual to surrender self-incriminating nontestimonial evidence. In Schmerber, the Court held that " [s] ince the blood test evidence [showing that the petitioner was intoxicated], although an incriminating product of compulsion was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds." Id. at 765. 77 104 S. Ct. at 2638 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor's holding that the gun should be admissible and that the statements should be suppressed is more faithful to the logic of Tucker than the Quarks majority opinion. Tucker's limited holding allowed only derivative evidence, the incriminating testimony of a third-party alibi witness, to be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Tucker upheld the lower court's decision that Tucker's statements were not to be used against him in court. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion attacked both the factual and legal analyses of the majority. Disputing the majority's factual finding that the public safety was imperiled, Justice Marshall pointed to the New York Court of Appeals finding "that there was no evidence that the interrogation was prompted by the arresting officers' concern for the public's safety." 8 5 In response to the majority's attempt to slip away from these unambiguous findings "by proposing 433, 446 (1974) . Both Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist interpreted Wong Sun to hold that the Court must suppress evidence derived from a constitutional violation, although it must admit evidence emanating from the mere failure to recite nonconstitutional protective Miranda warnings. Justice O'Connor's analysis employs a bifurcated standard for testimonial and nontestimonial evidence. Although Justice O'Connor concluded in the first part of her opinion that statements elicited in violation of Miranda were presumed compelled and hence, inadmissible, Justice O'Connor's adherence to Tucker required her to hold that the respondent must show that this statement was "blatantly coerced" and not only "presumptively compelled" to suppress the admission of the gun. 104 S. Ct. at 2640-41 n.4-5 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
This bifurcated standard invites police misconduct and deliberate disregard of Miranda because physical evidence is arguably more important to the prosecution's case than testimonial evidence. For a discussion of the prospect of police misconduct in a similar context, see Dershowitz and Ely, supra note 58, at 1215 n.71. 85 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's characterization of the New York Court of Appeals' holding seems to be a fairer representation than Justice Rehnquist's interpretation. Justice Rehnquist chastized the New York Court of Appeals for basing its denial of the public safety exception on the "subjective motivation" of the arresting officer. Id. at 2632. Actually, the New York Court reviewed both the "subjective intentions," the personal motives prompting the arresting officer to question the suspect without warnings, and "objective" facts, the specific nature of the circumstances surrounding Quarles' arrest, and found that neither a "subjective" nor an "objective" justification existed for creating the exception: "there is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety [objec- [Vol. 75 that danger be measured by objective facts rather than the subjective intentions of arresting officers," Justice Marshall replied that the New York Court of Appeals holding, that "there is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety," 8 6 was an objective evaluation of the situation. 8 7 In his most scathing assault on the majority's factual review, Justice Marshall cited a recent Supreme Court decision, Rushen v. Spain, 8 8 an opinion joined by four members of the Quarles majority, which stated that federal courts should defer to state court findings of fact in the absence of convincing evidence suggesting a contrary result.
8 9 Finding that the majority ignored "almost overwhelming evidence to support the New York court's conclusion," Justice Marshall stated that "[m]ore cynical observers might well conclude" that the policy of deferring to state court findings of fact is observed "only when deference works against the interests of a criminal defendant." 90 After criticizing the majority's "abuse" of the facts, Justice Marshall illustrated the chaos that a public safety exception may wreak on the "eighteen years of doctrinal tranquility" since Miranda enunciated the rules governing custodial interrogation. 9 ' Because the uncontested facts of QuarLes led the New York courts and the Supreme Court to reach opposite results, Justice Marshall questioned "how law enforcement officers will respond to the majority's new rule in the confusion and haste of the real world." 9 2 Citing Justice O'Connor's opinion, Justice Marshall shared her fears that disagreements over the scope and application of the public safety exception likely will confuse both courts and police officers. 520, 521 (1981) 93 Id. at 2645 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited Justice O'Connor's prediction that the "end result . . . will be 'a finespun new doctrine of public safety exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'" Id. (quoting 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Miranda sought to replace the voluntariness test with "a constitutional presumption that statements made during custodial interrogations are compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment and are thus inadmissible in criminal prosecutions. ' 9 4 Any statements elicited during custodial interrogations are inadmissible unless the prosecution can prove that the suspect had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. 9 5 Justice Marshall argued that the majority's creation of a public safety exception had ignored the constitutional presumption of coerciveness established by Miranda. In Marshall's view, the majority was unfaithful to the logic of Miranda because it failed to prove that custodial interrogations concerning public safety issues were any less coercive than other types of questioning. Justice Marshall also questioned whether a public safety exception would enhance police officers' ability to protect the public. Justice Marshall found that the "crux of this argument is that, by deliberately withholding Miranda warnings, the police can get information out of suspects who would refuse to respond to police questioning were they advised of their constitutional rights." ' 9 7 Thus, Justice Marshall argued that the public safety exception may encourage police interrogation tactics aimed to coerce suspects into divulging incriminating information. (Marshall, J., dissenting) . Justice Marshall acknowledged that the fifth amendment bar against the admission of coerced self-incriminating statements would hinder the state in prosecuting defendants where suspects retract their statements and then police have insufficient evidence to convict them. ButJustice Marshall noted that a defendant's recantation does not always result in the loss of incriminating evidence. In some cases, defendants may be willing to repeat their statements in exchange for favorable plea bargains or lighter sentences. Id. at 2648 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Supreme Court holding in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), allowed the prosecution to make use of a suspect's illegally obtained incriminating statements to impeach the suspect's in-court testimony. Thus,Justice Marshall correctly concluded that the majority overstated its case by contending that police officers were faced with the difficult choice between public safety and admissibility. 104 S. Ct. at 2648 n. 9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99 104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 100 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Wong Sun is the modem day articulation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine first articulated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first coined in Nar- V. ANALYSIS
In New York v. Quarles,' 0 5 the Court created an unprecedented exception to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona,' 0 6 marking the first time that the Court has held admissible primary self-incriminating statements obtained without the prescribed warnings. The majority's decision in Quarles is flawed by its reliance on Michigan v. Tucker. In Tucker, the Court confined its holding to Tucker's unique facts and refused to admit Tucker's self-incriminating statements. 1 0 7 The Quarles Court, however, cannot justify stretching Tucker's narrow holding to encompass the factual situation in Quarles and to serve as the instrumental precedent for creating a public safety exception. In fact, a comparison of Tucker and Quarles shows that the Court manipulated Quarles to fit within the Tucker precedent, and took a significant step towards overruling Miranda. 102 Id. 103 104 S. Ct. 2501 Ct. (1984 . In Nix, the Court allowed the admission of evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel to be used against the defendant where the prosecution showed that the incriminating evidence inevitably would have been discovered notwithstanding the violation. In Quarks, both the respondent and the petitioner briefed the inevitable discovery issue with regard to the gun. Justice Rehnquist's opinion mentioned this in a footnote, but claimed that because there was no Miranda violation in Quarks, the Court did not have to reach the inevitable discovery question. 104 S. Ct. at 2634 n.9. 104 104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 105 104 S. Ct. 2626 Ct. (1984 .
In Michigan v. Tucker,1 0 8 Justice Rehnquist concluded that Miranda warnings were not constitutional rights but were nonconstitutional prophylactic rules designed to protect a suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 10 9 In distancing Miranda from its constitutional roots, Justice Rehnquist solved a troubling factual situation by holding that failure to provide a suspect with full procedural safeguards, a mere technical Miranda violation, did not constitute "compulsion sufficient to breach the [suspect's] right against compulsory self-incrimination." ' 1 0 Thus, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Tucker from Miranda on the basis of the different police conduct in the two cases, holding that the less coercive police interrogation in Tucker did not bear "any resemblance to the historical practice at which the right against compulsory self-incrimination was aimed.""'
In casting Quarles within the Tucker mold, the majority did not compare the facts in the two cases to determine if the police conduct in each case was similarly noncompelling. Such a comparison would have exposed the Court's misreliance on Tucker. In Tucker, the Court characterized the police conduct as an "inadvertent disregard of the procedural rules later established in Miranda."" 2 The police conduct in Quarles, however, cannot be so easily excused. The arresting officer was "fully familiar with the requirements established in the Miranda decision," ' " 3 yet he still neglected to inform Quarles of the Miranda rights specifically designed to protect the suspect from self-incrimination during questioning. Unlike Tucker, where the Miranda violation was merely technical and the Court could be fairly sure that the interrogation was noncoercive, 1 4 the absence of Miranda warnings in Quarles raises doubts about whether Quarles' statements were of his own free will.
Instead of keeping with the spirit of Tucker and Miranda by addressing the coercion issue directly, the Quarles Court failed to examine the compelling nature of the custodial interrogation, stating "we have before us no claim that respondent's statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to re-108 417 U. S. 433 (1974 
113
Brief for Respondent at 65, New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984 . 114 417 U.S. at 436. The police officers in Tucker read to the respondent all of his rights except his right to appointed counsel. Prior to the interrogation, the respondent informed police that he understood the crime with which he was charged, that he did not wish to speak to an attorney, and that he understood his constitutional rights. Id.
708
[Vol. 75 sist." 1 15 The Court drew a distinction between "actual compulsion" and "presumed compulsion," holding that "[t]oday we merely reject the only argument that respondent has raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that the statement must bepresumed compelled because of Officer Kraft's failure to read him his Miranda warnings." 1 16 By finding that there was no claim of actual compulsion, the Court classified Quarles as a case like Tucker, involving police conduct that merely violated Miranda's nonconstitutional safeguards, instead of a Miranda-type case where the police action rose to the level of a constitutional violation.
The Court's dismissal of the coercion issue, by stating that the respondent failed to argue that the statements were actually compelled, disregards contrary arguments in the respondent's brief. In the brief, the respondent's counsel argued on at least two occasions that Quarles actually was compelled against his will to make 9elf-incriminating statements:
[i]t cannot be said on the basis of the record herein that the respondent's will was not, in fact, overborne when he was by at least four officers with weapons drawn, handcuffed, frisked and interrogated as to the location of the evidence. 17 and,
In view of the unchallenged compulsion and the substantial likelihood that the admissions and evidence obtained thereof were not the product of respondent's free will, the suppression of such admissions should be affirmed. 1 8 Although it is debatable whether the police conduct in Quarles was so coercive as to make the respondent speak against his will, there can be no doubt that the respondent's counsel argued that Quarles' statements were the product of "actual compulsion."
Even if the respondent's counsel failed to argue that Quarles' statements actually were compelled, a principled application of Miranda required that the Court presume that Quarles' statements were compelled. 1 9 Miranda was based on the premise that custodial interrogations without reading a suspect his rights are inherently coercive. Any statements elicited from such coercive questioning were presumed compelled and could not be used against a suspect at trial.' 20 Thus, Miranda rules were designed to remove the coercion Furthermore, Michigan v. Tucker provides no justification for the Court's dismissal of the coercion issue. In Tucker, the Court did not dismiss the respondent's complaint because his counsel failed to allege that the interrogation was actually coercive.' 2 2 Rather, the Court undertook an extensive examination of the circumstances of the interrogation. The Court then based its decision to admit derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation on its finding that the interrogation "involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination. "' 123 Before Quarles, the Court's post-Miranda decisions had kept Miranda's presumption of compulsion intact, never requiring that the defendant allege that his statements actually were compelled. Unfortunately for Quarles, the Court chose to narrow Miranda's exclusionary rule at his expense. In the name of "public safety," the Court resurrected the pre-Miranda due process voluntariness test that required the defense to argue that the conditions of the interrogation were so coercive that the suspect's ability to decide whether to answer questions was impaired.' 2 4 The Court thus erased Miranda's presumption of coercion and placed the burden on the defense to argue that "his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards."' 12 5 In making this radical shift from precedent, the majority effectively penalized Quarles for failing to make an argument that he could not have known was necessary. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) . In Watts, the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's murder conviction, finding that the petitioner's confession was involuntary when he was held without arraignment and without the aid of counsel. In addition, the petitioner was interrogated in solitary confinement by teams of police officers until he confessed. The Court stated,
[a] confession by which life becomes forfeit must be the expression of free choice. A statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered. But if it is the product of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from free choice. When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary . . . . To turn the detention of the accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as to offend the procedural standards of due process. Id. at 53-54. 125 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5. 126 Id. at 2647 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
VI. IMPLICATIONS
In Miranda, the Court sought to protect a suspect's right against compulsory self-incrimination by creating a per se rule that prohibited the admission of statements elicited from suspects during inherently coercive interrogations. Miranda's per se test had "the virtue of informing police officers and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogations are not admissible." ' 127 Unfortunately, the Quares Court's public safety exception replaces Miranda's per se rule with a rule providing little guidance to lower courts and law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the Quarles decision retreats from Miranda by giving arresting officers near absolute discretion 1 2 8 to 127 Id. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) ).
128 Police officers do not have unfettered discretion because their decisions to invoke the public safety exception ultimately will be subject to a reviewing court's determination of whether the exigency justified waiving the suspect's Miranda rights. But the Court's statements that the exception will "free officers to follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to public safety," 104 S. Ct. at 2633, and that "we think that police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect," id., when combined with the Court's action in overturning the factual determination of two lower courts that the exigencies of Quarles' arrest posed no threat to public safety, strongly suggests ajudicial policy of deferring to police decisions.
While interpreting the fourth amendment, the Court refused to grant police officers "unbridled discretion" to conduct warrantless searches of the scene of a homicide. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) . In Mincey, police officers investigating the scene of a murder conducted a warrantless search of the petitioner's apartment and seized over 200 objects to be used against the petitioner at his trial on murder, assault and narcotics charges. The Arizona Supreme Court held that a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of a homicide-or of a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play-does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the law enforcement officers were legally on the premises in the first instance. Id. at 390 (quoting State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977) ). The Arizona Supreme Court applied the murder-scene exception and affirmed the petitioner's narcotics convictions.
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to recognize a "murder-scene exception" to add to the list of exigent circumstances that may obviate the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The Court "decline [d] to hold that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search." Id. at 394. The Court refused to place the interpretation of such terms as 'reasonable. . .search,' 'serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play' and 'reasonable period' within the discretion of police officers when the warrant requirement bestows these judgmental determinations upon an objective and neutral magistrate. Id. at 395.
In Quares, both the majority, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3, and the dissent, id. at 2648 determine when to invoke the public safety exception. This combination of judicial uncertainty and increased discretion in the hands of local authorities harkens back to the pre-Miranda period and forbodes potentially destructive consequences to a suspect's fifth amendment rights. Paradoxically, the Quarles majority cited a policy of judicial reluctance to expand Miranda to preserve the clarity of Miranda's per se rule, but then chose to sacrifice this clarity to carve an exception to Miranda. 129 The majority justified its willingness to erode Miranda's per se rule by claiming that the new public safety exception provides a workable rule to guide the conduct of police officers.' 3 0
The majority felt that the standard for applying the public safety exception would be easy for police officers to ascertain "because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it."131 Quarles, however, stands as a testament to the confusion that the public safety exception may wreak on the Miranda doctrine. As Justice Marshall noted, the majority's faith in the clarity of the exigency standard is undermined by the fact that the New York courts and the Quarles majority disagreed over whether the exigencies of Quarles' arrest justified creating a public safety exception.' 3 2 Quarles aptly illustrates that the exigency standard for the public safety exception may be manipulated to reach a desired outcome simply by placing greater emphasis on certain facts. Thus, the vagueness of the exigency standard enabled the majority to hold that the threat of a loaded gun to an unsuspecting customer or employee mandated disn.10, cite Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1975) , for the proposition that "the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, are not removed by a showing of reasonableness." Ironically, the majority's public safety exception places the ultimate discretion to determine when to invoke the public safety exception in the hands of arresting officers. By providing police with this discretion, the Court blurs this distinction between the fourth and fifth amendment contexts and allows for a determination of "reasonableness" to pervade the fifth amendment doctrine. See 104 S. Ct. at 2632 (Miranda rules should not be applied to situations "when police officers ask questions that are reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety" (emphasis added)). By introducing a "reasonableness" analysis into the fifth amendment doctrine, the majority substantially weakened the more stringent application of the fifth amendment exclusionary rule.
129 104 S. Ct. at 2633.
130 Id.
'3' Id.
132 Id. at 2632 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, [i]f after plenary review two appellate courts so fundamentally differ over the threat to public safety presented by the simple and uncontested facts of this case, one must seriously question how law enforcement officers will respond to the majority's new rule in the confusion and haste of the real world. Id. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
warnings. If upheld, this use of the public safety exception would effectively overrule Miranda and enable police officers to freely interrogate suspects under the guise of public safety. Even if Miranda is not overruled, Quarles' vague standard of application does nothing to prevent "well intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous [sic] executive officers"' 140 from trampling upon the constitutional rights of suspects.
Finally, failure of the Court in Quarles to show that custodial interrogation about public safety matters is any less coercive than other lines of questioning deals perhaps the most devastating blow to a suspect's fifth amendment protection from compulsory selfincrimination. The Miranda Court specifically created the Miranda rules to protect suspects from the compelling pressures of custodial interrogation. Yet, the Quarks Court's public safety exception does nothing to ensure the uncoerced nature of a suspect's statements. In fact, the interrogation might be more coercive when police officers sense that the public is endangered. Thus, Quarles increases the likelihood that a suspect's conviction will be based on coerced self-incriminating statements.
VII. CONCLUSION
In New York v. Quarles, 14 1 the United States Supreme Court created a public safety exception to the once mandatory reading of Miranda rights, permitting police officers to freely interrogate suspects when they instinctively feel that the public safety is imperiled. The Court found that the decision freed police from the split-second determination of whether to "ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings" and risk losing any evidence discovered, or to issue the warnings and risk impairing their "ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them."' 4 2
The majority acknowledged that the exception lessened the clarity of the Miranda doctrine, but nonetheless felt that their decision would enable police officers to better protect the public.
43
The majority's statement that the decision may obscure the state of the Miranda law fails to consider the grave consequences of such confusion for the rights of accused persons. By creating an exception that requires a fact-specific, case-by-case review, the Court has eroded Miranda's bright-line test and provided little gui-140 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) dance to law enforcement officials and lower courts. The effect of this public safety exception on the future of Miranda is now to be fought in the streets and in the courts as police officers and judges battle over the scope and application of the exception. Certainly, the Miranda majority did not intend that the precious constitutional right against self-incrimination would be subjected to such a pernicious game of tug of war.
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